Israel and Iran have no clear strategy for ending the conflict
The current conflict between Israel and Iran is dangerous because both sides have no clear and effective strategies for ending the conflict, according to our Cairo-based correspondent, Ahmad Abdel-Rahman.
Recently, the US reluctantly echoed the ironically contradictory Israeli idea of "escalation for de-escalation" in Lebanon. Two days later, the US confidently discussed a 21-day ceasefire in Lebanon that would begin immediately. However, the US administration's actions were characterised by confusion and reproach, claiming that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had manipulated and deceived Biden's administration. It was arguably the most belated "come-back" moment in history, given how Netanyahu manipulated the Biden administration last year.
Neither argument is viable—and now the escalation of already explosive Israeli-Iranian relations is about to spiral out of control, threatening to drag the US into the maelstrom that it could unwittingly cause.
What is perhaps most disturbing is that Israel has engaged in two entirely justified wars but that have a glaring lack of clarity in political objectives and a strategy for ending the conflict in both. There is no ceasefire or post-war political framework in Gaza, and now it is waging war with Hezbollah – and with Iran – without a coherent set of political objectives and specific outcomes other than the military humiliation of its enemies.
In this context, Netanyahu's megalomaniacal assertion to the "Iranian people" that "the moment when you will be free is closer than you think" seems even more bizarre and arrogant. By invoking the rhetoric of regime change, he is infuriating Iran rather than de-escalating. "Escalation" is clearly the term of the year in the Middle East. Escalation is usually the result of a deliberate decision or a failed or incomplete deterrence, and that is precisely what is happening between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon – and now, quite possibly, between Israel and Iran.
This escalation phase began in early October 2023, when Hezbollah made a series of severe miscalculations and strategic mistakes that cost the organization dearly and may have weakened it considerably. With the massive Israeli air invasion of Lebanon and the losses suffered by this small country, it became clear that the so-called war of support for Gaza, which Hezbollah relied on, had exhausted all the excuses presented by Hezbollah and placed Lebanon in a circle of danger. Ultimately, Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah's arrogance and delusions of power proved to be its undoing.
First, the decision on October 7, 2023, to join the war between Israel and Hamas as an expression of solidarity backfired. This was not Hezbollah's war, and it acknowledged that (as did Iran) on October 8. Hezbollah's constant fire had become unbearable and intolerable in Israel, and the decision to escalate further by firing more rockets, drones, and missiles at northern Israel in more significant numbers and with greater frequency was disastrous.
Second, while it is true that the war now has two active fronts, with an ominously dangerous Iranian arena, it is not being fought intensively on both fronts at once because the Gaza theatre has largely subsided.
Third, Iran's guiding principle in managing its proxy network is simple: proxies fight for Iran—Iran does not fight for its proxies.
So far, and especially since the assassination of Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran on July 31, Iran has exercised caution and restraint. The cost-effectiveness equation surrounding being drawn into war to defend Hezbollah may not be cost-effective.
Nevertheless, Iran faced a dilemma: Israel has not only been operating in Iran itself; Hezbollah has long been Iran's most powerful proxy and its most prominent external project. Failure to respond would have sent a negative message to other terrorist movements in Yemen, Iraq, and Syria. Moreover, neither China nor Russia wants to defeat Iran in such a confrontation\, since their foreign policy approach is based on a zero-sum game with America.
gIran is driven by a messianic ideology that believes in the coming of a group of followers and by deep resentment and hostility toward the West. This does not mean that it is an irrational or suicidal actor—quite the opposite. Over the years, Iran has proven itself a smart geopolitical power. It now wants sanctions relief and a renewal of the nuclear deal with the West. It is also likely to rethink future approaches to outsourcing regional policy to organizations such as Hezbollah or the Houthis in Yemen.
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