Has the Iranian project in Syria ended with the fall of Bashar al-Assad?
Syria's importance stems from its role as the logistical corridor for Iranian supply lines to Hezbollah and as the only Arab ally since the Iran-Iraq war. It was also an outlet to the Mediterranean. Moreover, writes Ahmad Abdel Al Assad, Tehran will not be able to rebuild Hezbollah militarily.
The recent developments in Syria were linked to Iran, and the fall of Bashar al-Assad was considered an Iranian failure. These questions began to be raised: Has the Iranian project ended with the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime, Iran's ally? Has Syria left the so-called Axis of Resistance entirely? What is the future of Iranian investments in Syria over the past 12 years since its direct intervention in the Syrian civil war? What is the impact of the fall of the Assad regime on Iran? Can Tehran negotiate with the new Syrian regime?
Operation Al-Aqsa Flood will not be a turning point in Gaza's future but rather a significant turning point that will be recorded in the history of the Middle East, especially with regard to Iran's role and the so-called Axis of Resistance, which has received successive blows over the past months. These blows began with the elimination of the military capabilities of the Hamas movement, then Hezbollah, and finally, the overthrow of the Assad regime.
Despite the speech of the Iranian Supreme Leader a few days ago, in which he indicated that Iran's most significant loss was in Hezbollah and not Syria, the Assad regime occupied a major position in Iran's regional strategy. This explains why Iran invested militarily, financially, and economically in Syria and worked to control Syrian society and incite sectarian strife within it. The size of what Iran invested in Syria during the economic crisis is estimated to be between USD 30 billion and USD 50 billion.
Syria's importance stems from the fact that it was the logistical corridor for Iranian supply lines to Hezbollah, the only Arab ally since the Iran-Iraq war, and Tehran's outlet on the Mediterranean. Therefore, Iran's ability to rebuild Hezbollah militarily, which depended on the flow of weapons through Syria, will be weakened.
Iran also believes that it has lost the main ally in what it calls the "Shiite Crescent" that linked Iran and Iraq across the borders of Lebanon and Syria.
Perhaps Iran now realizes that it is a candidate for Israeli targeting through targeting its nuclear program or igniting internal popular tensions, especially against the backdrop of wasted investments in the Assad regime. Then, demonstrations can demand improving economic conditions instead of directing resources toward conflicting countries. Therefore, the Iranian media is trying to promote the idea that supporting the Assad regime is a kind of return of favour because the Syrian regime supported Iran during its war with Iraq in the eighties.
The fall of Assad gave Turkey, Iran's regional rival, the upper hand in shaping Syria's future in exchange for Tehran's diminishing influence.
How will Iran move in the coming period?
Perhaps Tehran will try to open relations with the new Syrian government. Iranian officials have begun to contact the new players in Syria. They will try to negotiate to not lose the investments and economic projects that may be controlled there. Therefore, media reports confirmed that Tehran exchanged diplomatic messages with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham before the fall of Bashar al-Assad's government, and it believes that these developments required it to talk to the other party in Syria.
Hence, the Iranian Foreign Ministry issued a statement stating that "in view of the recent developments in Syria, and while recalling Iran's principled position of respecting Syria's unity, national sovereignty and territorial integrity, it affirms that determining the fate and decision of Syria's future is up to the people of this country alone, without destructive interventions or foreign imposition."
The statement was traditional and does not clarify the reality of the relations between Syria and Iran for more than four decades. Still, Tehran is trying to open a dialogue with the new players. On the other hand, Iran will work to recruit young Sunni Syrians and form militias that it will fill with hostility against Israeli movements in Syria to create militias that it can rely on.
This is in addition to Iran's attempt to open a dialogue with the Kurds and benefit from the tense relations between them and Turkey. Therefore, it will try to create allies with whom its interests are linked inside Syria and weaken Turkey's influence there.
Iran will certainly review its regional and deterrence strategies in light of the new data, which will clarify whether its dependence on Syria will remain within its axis or whether Syria has left the Iranian axis forever.
For more on the Middle East go to www.lcdmedia.net
Comments